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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines an indicator to transform abnormal accruals (AA) into a proxy for 
accrual-based risk reduction caused by managers' discretionary behaviors. A break-even 
point based on operating cash flows (CFBEP) is introduced to derive the indicator). Early 
studies specifically addressed total accounting accruals (T A) for the purpose of detecting 
earnings management (Healy [1985]; DeAngelo [1986]). Later, TA was categorized into an 
expected component, as nondiscretionary accruals (NDA) , and an unexpected residual 
component, as discretionary accruals (DA). The latter is assigned as a proxy of managers' 
discretionary behaviors. However, these models presented the possibility of yielding biased 
results because their residual, AA, is defined as a proxy of an unobservable error term in 
the estimating model of NDA. Therefore these models were modified by addition of some 
explanatory variables to improve their NDA estimation precision (Jones [1991]; Dechow et 
al. [1995]; Kasznik [1999]; Kothari et al. [2001]). 
However, in spite of a series of modifications, AA remains primarily useful as the 
indicator to analyze the vector (downward or upward) of earnings management. This study 
adds the above indicator as another proxy for managers' discretionary behaviors. The big 
bath accounting hypothesis should be especially tested to investigate the significance of the 
indicat02). In addition, total sample firm-years are divided into a subsample for which the 
sign of AA shows negative to examine behaviors of big bath accounting firms. In this 
subsample, the sign of AA cannot be used to test for earnings management to any greater 
1) I would like to thank the AAA conference of 'Quality of Earnings' participants in Emory University, which was 
held in 2002 by the American Accounting Association. Particularly, I should express my appreciation to Jane 
F. Mutchler, Georgia State University and Grace Pownall, Emory University, who enabled me to attend this 
conference. 
2) The word' break-even point of cash flow' is introduced in Eiteman [1951] and Kunihiro [1958]. In particular, the 
CFBEP is systematically introduced by Kunihiro [1958] and extended by Kato [1987] from the perspective of 
financial analysis. 
3) The term 'big bath accounting' is ordinarily used to indicate manipulation that temporarily reduces income and 
can be called 'income-decreasing accounting decision', although the term is typically used when income is 
reduced by a large amount (Penman [2001]). I do not investigate 'aggressive accounting management' in this 
paper. That term is used to indicate manipulation that temporarily increases income. Other hypotheses and 
samples are required for such a study. 
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extent, whereas the indicator presented in this paper can be used freely in examination. 
Results of this study show that the big bath accounting hypothesis is supported strongly 
by the indicator within the subsample. These findings can be interpreted that the indicator 
provides useful assistance for the sign of AA in detecting earnings management. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some prior studies on measurement 
of DA and examines common properties of these models. Section 3 describes an indicator 
of risk exposure caused by fluctuation of operating cash flows and another indicator to 
transform AA into a proxy for the degree of risk reduction. Some working hypotheses 
associated with the indicator are stated in section 4. Section 5 examines the definition of 
financially distressed firms to test the working hypothesis; descriptive statistics are shown 
there. Section 6 presents empirical results for tests of the hypotheses; the last section 
comprises a conclusion and future subjects for study. 
2. MEASURE OF DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS 
Shipper [1989] reported that earnings management is defined as "purposeful intervention 
in the external reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain to manager 
or shareholders." The focal point of the study of earnings management is to recognize not 
only the emergence of managers' discretion, but the influence or incentive of managers' 
discretionary behaviors. This paper examines managers' incentives toward accrual-based 
risk reduction as their discretionary behaviors. 
In this section, the representative residual models of DA are reviewed in accordance with 
Dechow et al. [1995]. In these studies, total accruals are defined as the change in non-cash 
current assets less the change in current liabilities (exclusive of short-term debt and taxes 
payable), less depreciation and amortization expense as 
(2.1) 
where: 
TAit = total accruals for firm i in year t; 
~CAit = change in current assets for firm i between year t and year t-l; 
~Cashit = change in cash and cash equivalent for firm i between year t and year t-l; 
~CLit = change in current liabilities for firm i between year t and year t-l; 
~STDit = change in debt included in current liabilities for firm i between year t and 
year t-l; 
~DEPit = depreciation and amortization expense for firm i between year t and year 
t-1. 
When Dechow et al. [1995] examined representative accruals-based residual models4), they 
characterized all models in the same general framework to facilitate compatibility by 
adjusting the original form of each model. Therefore their approach can be formulated as 
where: 
DA~t = proxy of discretionary accruals for firm i in year t; 
T Ait = total accruals for firm i in year t; 
NDAit = nondiscretionary accruals for firm i in year t, and 
E( TA )it = prediction of total accruals for firm i in year t. 
(2.2) 
Dechow et al. [1995] argued that the expected value of TA is defined as NDA, and that 
the difference between T A and NDA is inferred to be a proxy of DA (DAP). In other 
words, DAP is given as a prediction error (residual) of the regression model of NDA. 
Therefore, DAP can be called abnormal accruals (AA). 
Healy [1985] examined earnings management by comparing mean total accruals as 
earnings management partitioning variables. He predicted that accrual-based earnings 
management occurs systematically in every period and that T A in each period could equal 
NDA. He inferred that the time series of NDA follows a white noise pattern throughout 
estimation periods. Under his assumption, NDA in every period is independent in preceding 
and subsequent periods and the mean NDA results in zero. Then DA is computed as DA 
= T A - 0, so that T A in the event period is used as a proxy of DA . 
De Angelo [1986] solves the problem of the Healy model using first difference in total 
accruals. That study presumes that the first difference is equal to zero under the null 
hypothesis of no earnings management. In other words, T A in previous periods is 
presumed to equal NDA in the current period. The DeAngelo model can be interpreted as 
an estimation model with the supposition that the time series of T A follows a random walk 
process. The first derivative of T A shows a white noise pattern because random walk means 
a stochastic process of differences in a time series. 
A common feature of the Healy and DeAngelo models is that they estimate the magnitude 
of DA by considering the expected value of T A as a proxy of NDA during estimation 
periods. However, Kaplan [1985] reported that NDA should be made more accurate to 
measure such nondiscretionary components directly. 
4) On the other hand, McNichols and Wilson [1988] examined the discretionary portion of a single accrual 
account. It showed that the effect of allowance on bad assets captured earnings management. They 
addressed the discretionary component by which managers' accounting choices are likely to be influenced. 
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Jones [1991] expands the approaches of prior research and allows statistical estimation of 
NDA. That study introduces regression analysis to separate NDA from T A. This model 
relaxes the assumption set in Healy [1985] and DeAngelo [1986], whose premise is that 
NDA is constant. In contrast, Jones [1991] estimates NDA in the event year by the 
following regression model: 
(2.3) 
where 
!1RE ~t = change of sales revenues for firm i in year t scaled by total assets at year 
t-l ; 
PPEit = gross property plant and equipment for firm i in year t scaled by total 
assets at year t-l; 
A it - I = total assets for firm i in year t-l, and 
a l • a z• a 3 = firm specific parameters. 
Firm-specific parameters a l • a z and a 3 are given as OLS estimates in the regression 
model (2.3). This model attempts to control the effect of changes in firms' economic 
circumstances by which NDA is influenced. Although a contribution of the Jones model is 
to introduce the regression model of NDA, it includes an implicit problem: sales revenues 
are considered to be nondiscretionary. This problem biases the orthogonalization related to 
total accruals and earnings management. 
Dechow et al. [1995] proposed eliminating the conjectured tendency of the Jones model. 
They indicated that revenues include not only components influenced by external economic 
factors, but also components changed by discretionary management of delivery or shipment. 
In addition, they show a prediction model of nondiscretionary accruals in which the 
difference between the change of revenue and the change of revenue on credit sales are 
adopted as independent variables. By introducing these variables, even as managers attempt 
to manipUlate the volume of sales revenue, the corresponding change of revenue on credit 
sales absorbs the component of their manipulations. This model is called the "Modified 
Jones Model" and NDA is estimated during periods in which earnings management is 
hypothesized as follows: 
where !1REC denotes net receivables in year t less net receivables in year t - 1 scaled by 
total assets at year t - 1. 
As noted above, vanous types of accrual models have been proposed for detecting 
earnings managementS). Although these models have been improved incrementally in recent 
literature, the sign of AA is commonly used as a proxy of DA. This study examines how 
accurately the sign of AA can indicate managers' discretion and what kind of proxy should 
be used to analyze earnings management precisely from the financial analysis perspective. 
Accordingly, a subsequent section proposes the addition of an indicator to transfonn AA 
into a proxy for accrual-based risk reduction caused by managers' discretionary behaviors. 
3. DISCRETIONARY BEHAVIOR REDUCING CASH FLOW RISK 
Even if managers practice upward or downward accrual-based earnings management, 
they find it difficult to adjust the risk exposure of cash flows stimulated by fluctuation of 
operating activity. In other words, managers can directly manage finns' reported earnings, 
but they cannot control the risk of cash flows caused by the uncertain change of sales or 
other external economic events. The cash flow risk, therefore, emerges as the result of 
accrual-based earnings management. This section presents a mechanism and indicator of 
cash flow risk. 
3.1 Break-even point based on cash flows 
This sub-section proposes a margin of safety ratio and the degree of leverage, both of 
which are measured on the basis of CFBEP. 
Operating income is shown as follows according to the process of cost-volume-profit 
analysis: 
where 
EARit = RE~t - VCit - FCit 
= CMit' REV:t- FC it • 
EARit = operating income for finn i in year t; 
RE ~t = sales revenues for firm i in year t; 
VCit = variable cost for finn i in year t; 
FC it = fixed cost for finn i in year t; 
CMit = contribution margin for finn i in year t and meaning of 1- vit ; 
vit = VC -to- REV ratio, VCi/ REV:t. 
(3.1) 
Calculation of net cash flows from operating activities (CFO) can be shown as 
5) Kasznik [1999] developed a model that controls for the effect of the change of cash flows on the size of DA; 




where TA denotes total accruals explained in eq. (2.3). Working capital total accruals 
(WT A), presented by Chan et al. [2000], are used to accurately clarify the structure of 
CFO as funds. Then WT A is defined simply as the change of accounts receivable, plus 
change oCinventories, less change of accounts payable, less depreciation and amortization 
expense. 
In eq. (3.1), RE V is defined as BEP when EAR is set equal to 0; when volume of CFO 
is expressed as eq. (3.2) and CFO is set equal to 0, then REV is defined as CFBEP. As 
a result, the following two expressions of break-even points are given, respectively, as: 
BEP - FCit 
it - CMit' 





Therein, BEP indicates the point of RE V at which expenses and revenues balance. In a 
similar manner, CFBEP indicates REV at a break-even point based on cash flows, at 
which time cash inflows and outflows balance. Indeed, these two financial indicators can 
represent a benchmark that reflects the minimum level of continuous operation from the 
viewpoint of earnings and cash flows. 
For eq. (3.4), T A can be divided in two components: AA and NDA. Because NDA is 
presumed to be influenced by various external factors out of firms' control (e.g. economic 
events such as recession) aside from managers' discretion, Jones-type models assign REV 
and PPE to independent variables in each regression model. In particular, REV can 
actually be influenced by firms' external factors. Therefore NDA is presumed to be 
generated in proportion to REV; thereby, CFO of eq. (3.2) can be shown as 
(3.5) 
where RNR denotes the NDA-to-REV ratio: NDA IRE V. 
The assumption that NDA is simply proportional to sales revenues is problematic because 
NDA can be considered to be affected by various factors aside from REV. However, this 
assumption is made because NDA is defined as a statistical expectation and offers the 
greatest possibility to contain the component affected by firms' external factors that are 
beyond managers' discretion. Actually, only sales revenues and accounts receivable in the 
modified Jones model can be considered to serve as factors that are affected directly by 
external economic events. Then the influence of discretionary accruals upon CFBEP can be 
obtained as the following expression: 
(3.6) 
AA is included in eq. (3.6) as a proxy of discretionary accruals and affects the position of 
CFBEP. Therefore the following expression of CFBEP excluding managers' discretion can 
be given as 
FCit NCFBEPit = ---------''-'-------CMit - RNRit ' (3.7) 
where NCFBEP denotes the nondiscretionary cash flows break-even point and is given by 
eq. (3.5), excluding AA. Thereby, the position of NCFBEP can be isolated as a cash flow 
break-even point under the condition that managers' discretion has been eliminated. Its 
value could indicate a benchmark showing whether managers have made discretionary 
accounting decisions or not. Applying these indicators, the influence of managers' discretion 
can be captured as the change of the position of CFBEP. 
3.2 Indicator of accrual-based risk reduction 
An indicator of risk exposure is assigned to show an indicator to transform AA as a proxy 
of accrual-based risk reduction. The margin of safety ratio (MSR) may serve this purpose. 
It is computed as : 
MSR. = RE~t-BE~t 
It RE~t (3.8) 
If MSR increases, the reciprocal of MSR decreases. For that reason, the reciprocal of 
MSR can serve as a measure of risk exposure. Moreover, the reciprocal of MSR equals the 
elasticity of operating income for sales revenues. Therefore, risk exposure based on MSR 
can be expressed as : 
1 _ _ dEARit I EARit 
MSR. - DOLit - dREV REV' It It It 
(3.9) 
where DOL denotes the degree of operating leverage and shows the elasticity of EAR for 
REV, i.e., the percentage change in operating income associated with a given percentage 
change in sales revenue. Therefore, DOL should be viewed as a measure of potential risk; 
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that risk magnifies the impact of variability or uncertainty of sales revenues and production 
costs. Consequently, DOL becomes active only in the presence of sales revenues and 
production cost variability. 
Further, MSR and DOL can be extended to the risk indicators provided by CFBEP, 
those which can be expressed as the margin of safety ratio based on cash flows (MSRC) , 
and the degree of operating leverage based on cash flows (DOL C) 6). The definition and the 
result of computatiofl of DOLC can be expressed as: 
DOLC't = dCF°it I CFOit 
z dRE~t RE~t 
(3.10) 
(CMit - RNRit)RE~t 
(CMit - RNRit)RE~t- FCit - AAit ' 
As described in eq. (3.9), DOLC is defined as elasticity of CFO for REV, or it 
shows the ratio of percentage change of CFO over the percentage change of RE V. Thus, 
the change of DOLC shows the fluctuation of CFO leveraged or magnified by variability 
of REV. For example, when REV grows by 1.0%, the change of CFO shows 2.0% under 
the condition that the value of DOLC is 2.0. Therefore DOLC can indicate firms' risk 
exposure based on variability of operating cash flows caused by the change of sales 
revenues. 
From eq. (3.10), negative (positive) AA decreases (increase) the value of DOLC, 
meaning that risk exposure shown by DOLC is decreased (increased) by negative AA. 
Likewise, NCFBEP in eq. (3.7) can indicate firms' risk under the condition that managers' 
discretionary behavior is neither observed nor eliminated. NCFBEP is modified to show 
the nondiscretionary degree of leverage based on operating cash flows (NDOLC). It is 
given as: 
dNCF° it I NCF° it NDOLCit = ---=-dRE~t RE~t 
(3.11 ) 
6) Kato [1987] expanded the discussion on CFBEP into MSRC, whereas Sato and Sato [2002] introduced DOLC 
as an indicator of risk exposure provided by cash flow information, 
FIGURE 1 
Risk Reduction Explained by the Position of CFBEP and NCFBEP 
o 
CFO CFO(AA) a 
CFO(NOA) b 
r---------~~--~~--~~---------------REV 
CFBEP ¢=:J NCFBEP 
(OOLC) (NOOLC) 
a CFO(AA) denotes cash flows from operating activity including abnormal accruals. 
b CFO(NDA) denotes cash flows from operating activity excluding abnormal accruals. 
C CM and RNR denote contribution margin and NDA ·REV ratio, respectively. 
d The arrow of AA - shows that observed negative abnormal accruals makes CFO(NDA) 
line shifted toward the CFO(AA) line. 
e CFO- denotes net operating cash flows: it shows negative value under current REV. 
f CFO+ denotes positive net cash flows provided from operating activities and gives the 
condition to reduce accrual·based risk. 
Therein, NCFO is defined as operating cash flows' eliminated nondiscretionary component, 
which is given by excluding AA from eq. (3.5); NDOLC can be computed as the elasticity 
of NCFO for REV. The same result can be obtained by excluding AA from eq. (3.10). 
NDOLC can be used as an indicator of risk exposure under the condition that managers' 
discretionary behavior (AA) is neither observed nor eliminated. 
Figure 1 presents the association between RE V and CFO. Therein, CFO (AA) denotes 
operating cash flows expressed by eq. (3.5), whereas CFO(NDA) denotes operating cash 
flows from which AA is eliminated. By observing AA as managers' discretions, 
CFO(NDA) shifts to CFO(AA) and NCFBEP moves to CFBEP simultaneously. As a 
result of this shift, net operating cash flows remains positive (CFO +) , 
and then NDOLC changes to DOLC. 
From eq. (3.10) and (3.11), negative AA decreases DOLC to less than NDOLC, 
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provided that {( CMit - RNRit ) REV;t - FCit } > o. This movement, then, shows that 
negative AA engenders positive net cash flows (CFO+) and decreases risk exposure caused 
by -DOLC less than NDOLC. 
Therefore, the DOLC-NDOLC ratio (RDN) is assigned as the indicator of accrual-
based risk reduction brought by negative AA (downward earnings management). The 
following expression is given as RDN: 
_ DOLCit 1 
RDNit - NDOLCit = 1 + CF0it AAit. 
(3.12) 
Accrual-based risk reduction indicates that negative AA is observed not only as a result 
of income-decreasing management. It shows the effects of managers' rational behavior, 
which can be recognized as risk reduction using discretionary accruals. 
Dechow et al. [1995] and Guay et al. [1996] indicate the insufficiency of discretionary 
accrual models to provide evidence of earnings management because the Jones type models 
compute a proxy of DA as a residual of its own estimation process of NDA. Therefore 
testing for emergence of earnings management by this type of regression model could yield 
biased results if measurement error in a proxy were caused by a failure to identify 
economically determined accruals as a nondiscretionary component (Kasznik [1999]). 
To overcome this deficiency, addition of RDN can improve the ability to detect 
managers' discretion. Whether RDN can serve precisely as an indicator to transform AA 
into a proxy of accrual-based risk reduction is investigated next. In eq. (3.12), if AA shows 
a negative (positive) sign, RDN takes a value of less (more) than unity, provided that CFO 
remains positive. Association between AA and RDN can be expressed as the following. 
{
AAit < 0 =? RDNit < 1 
AAit > 0 =? RDMt > 1 
(3.13) 
Equation (3.13) designates the value of AA as having a positive correlation to the value of 
RDN under the condition that CFO remains positive. This condition of CFO is shown in 
Fig. 1, where the CFO(AA)-line shift is restricted in the extent to which CFO is positive 
(CFO +). On the contrary, if CFO is negative, the manager can be considered to be 
unconcerned about risk exposure related to the change of CFO. 
Therefore, RDN can be considered to be an indicator to transform AA into accrual-based 
risk reduction caused by managers' discretionary behaviors. Accordingly, RDN is proposed 
as an indicator of accrual-based risk reduction. By applying RDN, working hypotheses on 
earnings management are tested in the next section more precisely than by the preceding test 
based on the sign of AA . 
4. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1 Signal of financial distress 
To test for earnings management, McNichols and Wilson [1988] divided their cross 
sectional samples into partitions where discretionary behaviors are predicted by various 
earnings management hypotheses. That study classified sample firm-years into financially 
distressed firms and others to test the hypothesis regarding big bath accounting. Lau [1987] 
showed several stages of financial distress that can be identified depending on the severity 
of financial difficulties. That study classified states of financial distress: (0) stability, (1) 
omitting or reducing dividend payment, (3) prediction under the Bankruptcy Act, (4) 
bankruptcy or liquidation of a firm's assets. 
Although firms omitting or reducing dividend payment (Lau's state 1) are considered to 
be in the early stages of financial distress (Jaggie and Lee, [2002]), the present study 
specifically addresses omission and reduction in dividend payments as a signal of financial 
distress. 
Some regulations and social rules in Japanese capital markets influence managers' 
behaviors 7). For instance, the Japanese Commercial Code provides an upper limit to the 
extent of profit available for dividend and delegates authority to decide the amount of 
dividend payment to the meeting of shareholders. In addition, some market rules define 
listing conditions and standards of initial public offering of stocks and bonds. They also 
restrict the lower limit of dividend payment amounts in capital markets. 
Until the early 1990s, restriction of the lowest dividend payment has been fixed on a level 
called the '10% rule', meaning the dividend-to-face value ratio. Generally, this lowest 
restriction has prompted managers to adopt a low and stable dividend policy because this 
restriction is imposed at a sufficiently low level that firms can achieve it without difficulty. 
Under these circumstances, reduction under the lowest restriction or omission of dividend 
payment seems to be extremely bad news. Although this lowest restriction of dividend 
payment is merely a social rule and not legalized, dividend policy sentiment based on this 
restriction is disseminated widely in the market and obedience by managers is strongly 
suggested. 
As noted above, the Commercial Code restricts the extent of profit available for 
dividends. Firms facing financial difficulties usually need to omit or reduce dividend 
payment. As a result, firms in financial difficulties can not achieve the lowest restriction of 




dividend payment as a market rule; they are likely to pay particularly close attention to these 
minimum dividend restrictions. 
F or those reasons, if managers of financially distressed firms remain inclined to respond 
to the above peculiarity of Japanese capital markets, the events of omission and reduction 
of dividend payments are inferred as signals of financial distress in Japanese capital markets. 
4.2 Incentives of downward earnings management and risk reduction 
First, the hypothesis of big bath accounting is examined to find whether the estimated 
AA s of financially distressed firms differ significantly from those of other firms using the 
modified Jones model (Dechow et al. [1995]). 
In prior accounting literature, managers' incentives to use income-decreasing accounting 
choice are explained by setting various hypotheses: bonus plans (Healy [1985]; McNichols 
and Wilson [1988]), management buyouts (DeAngelo [1986]), change of management 
(Strong and Meyer [1987]; DeAngelo [1988]), debt covenant violation (Healy and Palepu 
[1990]), and import relief (Jones [1991]). In particular, DeAngelo et al. [1994a] examined 
the influence of persistent losses and dividend reductions based on DA on a sample of 
financially troubled firms. Their finding is that the managers of firms with and without 
binding dividend covenants engage in many acts of negative AA 8). 
The hypothesis presented by DeAngelo et al. [1994a] is supported markedly in some 
Japanese literature (Nakajo [1999]; and Enomoto [2001]). Therefore, the following 
hypothesis on earnings management was set and tested. 
HI: Managers of financially distressed firms are more likely to use 
income-decreasing accounting choice by managing the component 
of total accruals. 
Hypothesis HI states that financial distress is likely to correlate with AA as a proxy for 
downward earnings management, which subsumes that, if firms are financially distressed, 
then they are more likely to show negative AA. The accrual-based test of earnings 
management described by hypothesis HI can be expressed in terms of the following 
regression model (McNichols and Wilson [1988]): 
AA = a+/3PART+E (4.1) 
8) In contrast to DeAngelo et al. [1994a], DeFond and Jiambalvo [1994] found that managers of financially 
troubled firms use positive discretionary accruals to avoid debt covenant violations. 
where PAR T is an indicator variable that partitions the data into two classes for which big 
bath accounting predictions are specified. In eq. (4.1), a is the average value of DA in the 
class of non-distressed firms; a + j3 is the average value of DA of distressed firms. The null 
hypothesis of no earnings management would be rejected if the coefficient on the 
independent variable j3 were shown to be negative and statistically significant at 
conventional levels. 
Moreover, two samples are proposed: the sample of negative abnormal accruals 
comprises downward earnings management firms; the sample of positive abnormal accruals 
comprises upward earnings management firms. Thereby, the sign of AA. is more 
meaningful than the value of AA to specify whether the manager selects downward or 
upward earnings management. Then the following logit model examines hypothesis HI: 
Prob(NEGAA = 1) = F(a+/3PART+E), (4.2) 
where NEGAA denotes a dichotomous variable set equal to one if abnormal accruals are 
negative, and zero otherwise. In addition, a proxy of financial distress is substituted for 
PAR T to examine hypothesis HI in a subsequent section. 
If managers of financially distressed firms, those reducing or omitting dividends, select 
the big bath accounting management, they are exposed to the downward risk caused by 
income-decreasing accounting decisions. However, they are likely to be short of surplus 
cash flows under financial distress. Therefore they intend to avoid financial difficulties 
based on the shortage of cash flows. Accordingly, they would prefer an incentive to 
decrease risk exposure of operating cash flows by management of total accruals. In other 
words, they give priority to reducing the risk exposure caused by changing cash flows rather 
than to risk exposure caused by the change of reported earnings. They are likely to decrease 
the risk exposure measured by RDN rather than the decrease of DOL. The preceding 
argument is formalized in the following hypothesis: 
H2: Managers of the financially distressed firms are more likely to adopt 
accrual-based risk reduction. 
Prior studies of big bath accounting show that managers of financially distressed firms have 
an incentive to manipulate reported earnings downward to clear the performance of 
preceding periods and start proceeding business afresh. However, financially distressed 
firms (those firms omitting or reducing dividends) can not always have sufficient financial 
power to endure the difficulties of downward earnings management. Rather, their managers 
would seek to reduce risk exposure based on the shortage of cash flows. 
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Managers must have some reason (incentive) for practicing downward earnmgs 
management. Hypothesis H2 states that managers' incentives for big bath accounting are 
shown in their behaviors of accrual-based risk reduction. Therefore, the following logit 
regression model is used to examine H2: 
Prob(RDN = 1) = F(a+j3PART+E). (4.3) 
where RDN denotes a dichotomous variable equal to one if the value of RDN is less than 
one, zero otherwise. 
This logit model examines whether PAR T serves as a proxy of managers' incentives for 
accrual-based risk reduction. If a proxy of financial distress is substituted for PAR T, the 
model can examine whether managers of financially distressed firms are more likely to 
conduct accrual-based risk reduction measured by RDN. 
Hypotheses HI and H2, then, states that managers of financially distressed firms are 
more likely to practice income-decreasing management (AA < 0); then they succeed in 
accrual-based risk reduction (RDN < 1). If these two hypotheses are supported 
simultaneously, managers' discretionary behaviors observed as negative abnormal accruals 
can be interpreted as their own aggressive accounting behaviors, namely accrual-based risk 
reduction. Therefore, the value of RDN can be used as an important indicator of managers' 
discretionary behaviors of financially distressed firms in addition to the sign of AA. 
As a result of tests of hypotheses HI and H2, we can capture the managers' behaviors of 
risk reduction correlated with downward earnings management measured by RDN as an 
indicator to distinguish whether managers' discretionary behaviors em~rge or not. 
4.3 Research design 
To test appropriateness of dividend policy (omission or reduction of dividend payment) 
as a signal of financial distress, the associations linking dividend payment and the change 
of ordinary income; dividend payment and the change of sales revenues are examined 
respectively9) . 
Subsequently, hypothesis HI is tested for all sample firm-years usmg the proxy of 
dividend policy and the sign of AA. Logit regression analyses provided by eq. (4.2) are 
performed. The proxy of dividend policy is used as the dependent variable, whereas the sign 
9) Okabe [1994] and Otomasa [1997] provide the findings that financially distressed firms are more likely to report 
extraordinary income and losses. However, this paper examines firms' operating activities to investigate 
accrual-based downward earnings management. Then, the association between dividend policy as a proxy of 
financial distress and some financial indices showing results of firms' operating activities should be empirically 
examined. 
of AA is used as the independent variable. 
Next, RDN is introduced to the test of hypothesis H2. A good result on this would allow 
use of RDN as an indicator to transform AA into a proxy of accrual-based risk reduction 
recognized as emergence of managers' discretionary behaviors. That is, risk reduction using 
AA can be observed as evidence of downward earnings management. This test is conducted 
by another logit model presented by eq. (4.3). Further, not only all sample firm-years are 
tested, but also those subsample firm-years which comprise big bath accounting firms whose 
dividends are omitted or reduced (REDIV) and AA are negative (NEGAA). The sign of 
AA as a proxy of income-decreasing management cannot be used in the latter test; therefore 
the value of AA is used to investigate the emergence of accrual-based risk reduction 
measured by RDN. If both hypotheses 1 and 2 are supported, RDN can be considered to 
be an indicator to transform AA into a proxy of accrual-based risk reduction as 
representative of managers' discretionary behaviors. 
5. DESCR!PTIVE STATISTICS AND SIGNAL OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS 
5.1 Sample selection 
The following empirical analysis formally tests the hypothesis presented in the prior 
section: 6,320 firm-years listed on first and second section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
during 1998-2002 fiscal years were selected as the sample. These firms' accounting data 
were obtained from annual financial statements compiled by the 'Nikkei Financial Data for 
Listed Companies'. These sample firm-years comprise panel data restricted within 
manufacturing industries. Samples of non-manufacturing industries were eliminated because 
calculations of BEP and CFBEP of manufacturing firms are strictly different from those of 
non-manufacturing firms. 
In addition, samples with insufficient data (changing fiscal year, lacking data of five 
estimated years) and those for which BEP or CFBEP show a negative sign were excluded 
as discordant values. The resultant sample size consists of 5,970 firm-years as reported in 
Table 1. 
5.2 Descriptive statistics 
To overcome a disadvantage of the cross-sectional approach, which assumes that 
coefficients are the same for all samples within the estimation periods, all samples are 
divided into 20 industries following the standard categories of Nikkei Financial Data for 
Listed Companies. The NDA is estimated in every industry using the modified Jones model 
expressed in eq. (2.4). The center column of Table 1 reports results of estimations for each 
industry. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for estimates of all industries. It shows that 
the coefficient of change in sales revenues, bl, is likely to be positive (mean value = 0.032), 
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but not significantly so (t-statistic = 1.185). Whereas the coefficient of property, plant and 
equipment, bz, is significantly negative (t-statistic = -13.624). The mean (median) adjusted 
R2, whose value is 0.455 (0.470), shows that the model explains a significant portion of the 
variation in T A . 
Table 3 reports univariate statistics for T A, NDA, and AA; they are scaled by lagged 
total assets for all 5,970 firm-years. Means of T A, NDA, and AA are significantly 
negative (p <0.01), irrespective of each sample's financial condition. 
However, these samples should be categorized into firms adopting big bath accounting 
and others on the basis of the sign of AA and dividend policy to clarify the lucidity of 
managers' discretion. The right side of Table 1 and panel B of Table 3 report descriptive 
statistics for 1,693 big bath accounting firm-years whose dividends were omitted or reduced 
and signs of AA were negative. 
Earnings management at the discretion of managers of big bath accounting firms in panel 
B cannot be explained solely by the sign of AA even if they practice income-decreasing 
management. Therefore another indicator, i.e. RDN, which can support above mentioned 
defect of AA, is necessary to test the hypothesis for this subsample. 
6. Empirical Results 
6.1 Financial distress and dividend policy 
Okabe [1994, chap. 6] reports the findings that firms omitting dividends are more likely 
to increase extraordinary losses in every stock exchange of Japan. In contrast, the present 
study investigates the association between abnormal accruals based on firms' ordinary 
operation and big bath accounting. Therefore, dividend policy is examined to obtain 
evidence that can serve as a signal of financial distress. The geometric mean of the ordinary 
income through five fiscal years and the rate of sales revenue change in adjacent fiscal years 
are examined. The former is the index showing the durability of profitability and the latter 
indicates the growth of sales revenue. Therefore, the lowest class of each variable can 
provide an indicator showing financial distress. 
Panel A in Table 4 displays a contingency table showing: the relation between firms that 
omit and reduce dividend payments (REDIV) and other firms; and the relation between 
firms that the geometric mean of ordinary income through five fiscal years is extremely low 
(LOWEST) and others. Further, panel A in Table 5 provides another contingency table 
showing: the relation between REDIV and other firms; and the relation between firms for 
which the rate of sales revenues changes in consecutive fiscal years (GROWTH) IS 
extremely negative and other firms. 
The REDIV, LOWEST, and GROWTH variables are dichotomous: REDIV is set 
equal to one if a firm omits or reduces dividend payment, two otherwise; LO WEST is set 
TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Ordinary Least Squares Estimation of Accruals Model 
for Respective Industry of 5, 970 Firm -Years during 1998-2002 
Modified Jones Model: TAt = a l (Ij A-I) + /32 (Mill~t - bARit ) + /33 (PPEit ) + Cit 
All Sample Firm-Years Estimates of Modified Jones Model a Big Bath Firm-Years b 
N % of Total a b i b2 Adj. R2 N % of Total 
Foods 473 7.9 102 1.7 
Coefficient Estimate 0.020 -0.015 -0.150 0.600 
p-Value c 0.520 0.413 0.000 
Textile Products 245 4.1 93 1.6 
Coefficient Estimate 0.051 0.087 -0.159 0.472 
p-Value c 0.759 0.003 0.000 
Pulp & Paper 77 1.3 20 0.3 
Coefficient Estimate -0.035 0.009 -0.131 0.789 
p-Value c 0.786 0.874 0.000 
Chemicals 681 11.4 169 2.8 
Coefficient Estimate 0.107 0.005 -0.168 0.640 
p-Value c 0.019 0.798 0.000 
Pharmaceuticals 196 3.3 35 0.6 
Coefficient Estimate -0.027 0.127 -0.130 0.229 
p-Value c 0.409 0.034 0.000 
Petroleum 45 0.8 8 0.1 
Coefficient Estimate 0.077 0.361 -0.133 0.592 
p-Value c 0.310 0.000 0.021 
Rubber Products 101 1.7 34 0.6 
Coefficient Estimate 0.467 -0.043 -0.201 0.789 
p-Value c 0.000 0.434 0.000 
Stone, Clay & Glass Products 165 2.8 44 0.7 
Coefficient Estimate 0.136 -0.007 -0.152 0.433 
p-Value c 0.292 0.843 0.000 
Iron & Steel 230 3.9 82 1.4 
Coefficient Estimate 0.034 0.101 -0.160 0.560 
p-Value c 0.736 0.018 0.000 
Non ferrous metal & Metal Products 405 6.8 117 2.0 
Coefficient Estimate 0.123 0.031 -0.183 0.467 




TABLE 1 (continued) 
All Sam)2le Firm-Years Estimates of Modified Jones Model a Big Bath Firm-Years b 
N % of Total a b i b2 AdJ,R 2 N % of Total 
Machinery 778 13.0 256 4.3 
Coefficient Estimate 0.170 0.023 -0.172 0.204 
v -Value c 0.000 0.274 0.000 
Electric & Electronic Equipment 941 15.8 276 4.6 
Coefficient Estimate 0.142 0.062 -0.207 0.322 
v-Value c 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Shipbuilding & Repairing 25 0.4 9 0.2 
Coefficient Estimate -0.226 -0.377 -0.213 0.237 
v-Value c 0.388 0.032 0.024 
Motor Vehicles & Auto Parts 289 4.8 69 1.2 
Coefficient Estimate -0.060 -0.021 -0.210 0.692 
v-Value C 0.011 0.259 0.000 
Transportation Equipment 77 1.3 26 0.4 
Coefficient Estimate -0.066 -0.117 -0.176 0.211 
v-Value C 0.720 0.204 0.000 
Precision Equipment 174 2.9 51 0.9 
Coefficient Estimate -0.036 0.031 -0.189 0.233 
v-Value C 0.557 0.312 0.000 
Other Manufacturing 283 4.7 64 1.1 
Coefficient Estimate 0.002 0.030 -0.174 0.488 
v -Value C 0.965 0.163 0.000 
Fish & Marine Products 31 0.5 6 0.1 
Coefficient Estimate 0.048 0.194 -0.116 0.499 
v-Value C 0.839 0.005 0.000 
Mining 37 0.6 12 0.2 
Coefficient Estimate -0.120 0.209 -0.114 0.457 
v -Value C 0.181 0.000 0.000 
Constriction 717 12.0 220 3.7 
Coefficient Estimate -0.023 -0.035 -0.339 0.179 
p-Value C 0.578 0.094 0.000 
Total 5,970 100.0 1,693 28.4 
a al , b l, and b2 denote estimated coefficients a, Bb and B2 estimated by the modified Jones model, respectively. 
b Big bath firms are defined as the firm-years whose AA are negative and dividends are omitted or reduced_ 
C Two-tail p -value of a t-test for the prediction that the mean is zero. 
% 
TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Estimated Coefficients of the Modified Jones Model 
for Respective Manufacturing Industry during 1998-2002 
Modified Jones Model: TAil = a l (1/ At-I) +/32(b.REV;t~ b.ARit ) +/33 (PPEit ) +Eit 
Sample Firm-Years: 5,970 
N a Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile 
b 20 0.039 0.141 -0.230 0.470 -0.040 0.025 0.118 a 1 
t-statistic 20 0.783 2.182 -2.560 6.476 -0.580 0.256 1.779 
b1 b 20 0.032 0.144 -0.380 0.360 -0.020 0.025 0.098 
t-statistic 20 1.185 2.482 -2.296 8.205 -0.811 1.054 2.827 
b2 b 20 -0.174 0.050 -0.340 -0.110 -0.198 -0.170 -0.135 
t-statistic 20 -13.624 8.464 -33.783 -2.392 -17.618 -13.334 -5.870 
Adj. R2 20 0.455 0.196 0.179 0.789 0.234 0.470 0.598 
a N denotes the number of industries. 
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Descriptive Statistics for Total Accruals and Abnormal and Nondiscretionary Accruals 
for Sample of Firm -Years during 1998-2002 a 
N Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile 
Panel A: 5,970 firm-years 
Total Accruals b 5,970 -0.037 0.048 -0.265 0.684 -0.061 -0.038 -0.015 
p-Value c < 0.01 
Nondiscretionary Accrualsd 5,970 -0.033 0.020 -0.187 0.425 -0.043 -0.031 -0.020 
p-Value c < 0.01 
Abnormal Accrualse 5,970 -0.004 0.047 -0.244 0.549 -0.026 -0.005 0.016 
p-Value c < 0.01 
Panel B: 1,693 big bath accounting firm-years 
Total Accrualsb 1,693 -0.065 0.035 -0.265 0.010 -0.081 -0.059 -0.041 
p-Value c < 0.01 
Nondiscretionary Accrualsd 1,693 -0.030 0.018 -0.120 0.049 -0.040 -0.028 -0.018 
p-Value c < 0.01 
Abnormal Accrualsde 1,693 -0.035 0.033 -0.244 0.000 -0.048 -0.025 -0.011 
~-Value c < 0.01 
a See TABLE 1 for sample descriptive. 
b Total accruals are computed as the difference between operating earnings and cash flow from operations, deflated by total assets at the beginning of the year. 
C Two·tail p 'value of a t ·test for the prediction that the mean is zero. 
d Nondiscretionary accruals are estimated for each firm-year in every industry as predicted values of accruals. 
e Abnormal accruals denotes the prediction error as the proxy of discretionary accruals, i.e. the difference between total accruals and estimated nondiscretionary 
accruals. 
TABLE 4 
Loglinear Analysis for the Association between Dividend Policy and Mean of 
Ordinary Income 
Panel A: Contingency Table Classifying the Firms Omitting or Reducing 
Dividend Payments or Otherwise, and the geometric mean of the change of 
ordinary income. 























a Lowest shows firm-years whose geometric mean of the change of ordinary income is classified 
into the lowest 10th decile. 
b REDIV=l denotes firms omitting or reducing cash dividends and REDIV=O otherwise. 
C Parameter estimate shows the coefficient of (LOWEST)*(REDIV) in the loglinear modeL 
d The value oflogit in asymptotic 95% confidence interval is between 0.150 and 0.530 and the 
number in the parenthesis corresponds to the odds ratio. 
equal to one if a firm is included in the 10th percentile of mean ordinary income through five 
fiscal years, two otherwise; GROWTH is set equal to one if a firm is included in the 10th 
percentile of the rate of sales revenues changes in adjacent fiscal years, two otherwise. 
Panels B of Tables 4 and 5 report that the estimated parameter of interaction of REDIV 
and LO WEST ; REDIV and GRO WTH is 0.338 (Z-value=3.45) and 0.658 (Z-
value=7.42) respectively. These results provide evidence that REDIV can serve as a 
significant indicator of the condition showing financial distress IO). 
10) DeAngelo et al. [1994b] examined the association between dividend omission and losses of firms listed New 
York Stock Exchange. They find that an annual loss is essentially a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition 




Loglinear Analysis for the Association between Dividend Policy and Change 
of Sales Revenues 
Panel A: Contingency Table Classifying the Firms Omitting or Reducing 
Dividend Payments or Otherwise, and the change of sales revenues. 























a Lowest shows firm-years whose change of sales revenues is classified into the lowest 10th decile. 
b REDIV=l denotes firms omitting or reducing cash dividends and REDIV=O otherwise. 
C Parameter estimate shows the coefficient of (GROWTH)*(REDIV) in the loglinear model. 
d The value of logit in asymptotic 95% confidence interval is between 0.48 and 0.83 and the 
number in the parenthesis corresponds to the odds ratio. 
6.2 Logit regression for an incentive of big bath accounting 
To test hypothesis HI, all sample firm-years are classified into two classes based on the 
dividend change. One class comprises extremely distressed firm-years where dividends 
were omitted or reduced (RED/V). 
Moreover, all samples are divided again by the sign of AA, which has been estimated by 
the modified Jones model. The preceding section explains that a negative sign of AA 
suggests the existence of income-decreasing management. The big bath accounting premise 
states that the tested firm is financially distressed. 
RED/V, as an independent variable of financially distressed firms, is substituted for 
PAR T; the other control variables are added to eq. (4.2). The following is a logit regression 
TABLE 6 
Logit Regression Analysis of the Association Between Incentives to Adopt Big Bath 
Accounting and Negative Abnormal Accruals Proxy for Earnings Management a 
+/34FINSTit+cit) 
Variables N Predicted 
sIgn 
Coefficient p-Value 
intercept 4,760 nJa -2.239 0.000 
REDIV b + 0.433 0.000 
LNA C + 0.209 0.000 
LEV d 0.000 0.349 
FINST e -1.808 0.723 
Log Likelihood 7,913 
Chi-square 1.761 
p-value 0.987 
a NEGAA is a dichotomous variable set to one if the sign of abnormal accruals is negative, zero otherwise. 
b REDIV denotes dummy variable set to one if firm omits or reduces dividend payment, zero otherwise. 
C LNA denotes natural logarithms of total assets in the beginning of current period, t·1. 
d LEV denotes debt/equity ratio (leverage). 
e FINSTmeans the ratio of shares holded by financial institutes. 
model of negative abnormal accruals: it is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the sign 
of observed AA is negative, zero otherwise. 






e F(f3' X) 
l+e (3' x ' 
REDIV = dummy variable set to one if a firm omits or reduces dividend payment, 
otherwise zero; 
LN A = natural logarithms of total assets in the beginning of current period, t-l; 
LEV = debt-equity ratio (leverage); 
FINST = ratio of shares held by financial institutions to issued number of shares; 
E = error term. 
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Panel A in Table 6 provides descriptive statistics for variables used in the regression 
model examined in this subsection. The positive sign of the estimated coefficient on 
REDIV indicates the emergence of big bath accounting significantly (p < 0.000). 
Subsequently, the other explanatory variables are set to control for the effect of changes 
in firms' financial circumstances. First, LNA is input to control for the effect of firm size: 
the larger the firm, the more likely the manager is to choose accounting procedures that 
defer reported earnings from current to future periods (Watt and Zimmerman, [1986], 
p.235). The estimated coefficient on LNA shows a significant positive sign (p < 0.000), 
which is consistent with the prediction and provides statistical evidence of the size 
hypothesis. 
Next, LEV is input to control for leverage effects: the larger a firm's debt-equity ratio 
(leverage), the more likely the firm's manager is to select accounting procedures that shift 
reported earnings from future periods to the current periods (Watt and Zimmerman, [1986], 
p.216). The sign of the estimated coefficient on LEV is positive, thus the debt/equity 
hypothesis is not supported (p = 0.349). 
Further, the predicted coefficient on FINST is expected to be negative because the 
stricter the financial institutions monitoring firms' performance, the more likely the manager 
is to intend to increase or smooth the firm's reported earnings. The estimated coefficient on 
FINS T is consistent with this prediction, but the result is not statically significant (p = 
0.723). As a result of the logit regression analysis, evidence supporting hypothesis HI can 
be provided significantly11). 
6.3 Logit regression for accrual-based risk reduction 
This subsection presents tests of the second hypothesis, H2. Hypothesis H2 states that an 
incentive to accrual-based risk reduction is given by financial distress. Logit regression 
analysis examines all sample firm-years using the following logit model: 
Prob(RDNit = 1) = F(a+f31REDIVit+f32LNAit+f33LEV;t 
+f34FINS~t+Eit), 
(7.2) 
where RDN denotes the DOLC-to-NDOLC ratio. Section 4 explained that the logit model 
of (7.2) is given by substituting REDIV for PART to investigate the behaviors of 
financially distressed firms' managers. Table 7 reports that the estimated coefficient of AA 
in the model is significant and positive (p < 0.000). This supports the hypothesis that 
11) Pearson's correlation among LNA, LEV, and FINST are each less than 0.1; therefore, the problem of 
multicollinearity does not influence every regression model presented in this section. 
TABLE 7 
Logit Regression Analysis of the Associa tion Between Incen tives of Big Ba th Accoun ting 
and Accrual-based Risk Reduction a 
Model: Prob(RDNit = 1) = F(a + f31REDIV;t + f32LNAit + f33LEV;t 
+ f34 FINS7;t + G it ) 
Variables N Predicted Coefficient 
sIgn 
intercept 5,905 nJa -1.119 
REDIV a + 0.458 
LNA + 0.132 
LEV 0.000 
FINST -3.332 
Log Likelihood 7,642 
Chi-square 3.630 
p·value 0.889 







a RDN is a dichotomous variable set to one if it takes a value of less than unity, zero otherwise. 
financially distressed firms are more likely to practice accrual-based risk reduction. 
If income-decreasing management is, at most, no more than an incentive of big bath 
accounting, then some firms which actually adopt income-decreasing management can be 
classified into the another category of earnings management, e.g., income-smoothing 
management. 
To elucidate this point, 5,970 sample firm-years were divided into two classes following 
the definition of big bath accounting; then 1,693 firm-years were extracted as the big bath 
accounting firms, whose dividend payments were omitted or reduced and those AA were 
negative: 
Prob(RDNit = 1) = F(a+/31AAit+/32LNAit+/33LE~t 
+/34FINSTit+ci) , 
(7.3) 
where AA denotes the value of abnormal accrual observed as residual by the modified Jones 
model. Indeed, the effect of RDN can be tested for hypothesis H2 without stimulation of 
the sign of AA. Table 8 shows summary statistics for the logit model estimated coefficients 
of AA is significant and negative (p < 0.019). 
In addition, other controlled variables show similar results as the preceding analyses. The 
probability of accrual-based risk presented as hypothesis H2 is supported empirically. This 




Logit Regression Analysis of the Association between the Big Bath Accounting Firms 
and Accrual-based Risk Reduction Firms 
+/34FINS~t+Eit) 
Variables N Predicted Coefficient p-Value 
sign 
intercept 1,693 nla -3.033 0.010 
AA a 
-12.593 0.019 
LNA + 0.558 0.000 
LEV 0.000 0.153 
FINST -5.705 0.898 
Log Likelihood 485 
Chi-square 11.876 
p-value 0.157 
a AA denotes observed abnormal accruals as residuals estimated by the modified Jones model. 
only likely to select income-decreasing management, but that they do so to reduce risk 
exposure as a result of their discretionary behaviors. In particular, the result of the last logit 
regression suggests that RDN can fulfill its function as an indicator to transform AA into 
accrual-based risk reduction as a proxy for real discretionary accruals. 
7. CONCLUSION 
This paper provides evidence supporting the big bath accounting hypothesis by 
introducing an indicator (RDN) which provides a proxy of managers' discretionary risk 
reduction (accrual-based risk reduction). In particular, RDN is useful in testing a subsample 
for which the sign of AA is fixed at negative or positive. This fixed sign test gives 
confirming evidence and implication concerning the vector of earnings management. 
Regression analysis for accrual-based earnings management could yield biased results if 
measurement error in the proxy were caused by failure to identify economically determined 
accruals as a nondiscretionary component. Therefore RDN was proposed as an explanatory 
variable to avoid such biased results. Results show that the implication of RDN being 
representative of managers' discretionary behaviors as an indicator of accrual-based risk 
reduction can mitigate measurement errors caused by statistical methods as in Jones-type 
models. 
Two hypotheses presented were significantly supported in this paper. They state that 
managers of financially distressed firms are more likely to adopt income-decreasing 
accounting policies to conduct accrual-based risk reduction through income-decreasing 
management conducted by financially distressed firms' managers called big bath accounting. 
This paper provides the finding that their downward managements are based on incentives 
to obtain an effect of accrual-based risk reduction measured by RDN. Then, RDN gives us 
the probability to distinguish whether abnormal accruals result from managers' discretionary 
behaviors. 
However, these findings were obtained by examining only downward earnings 
management (big bath accounting hypothesis). This study tested for income-decreasing 
earnings management of firms whose financial circumstances are distressed. 
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This paper examines an indicator to transform abnormal accruals into a proxy for accrual-
based risk reduction caused by managers' discretionary behaviors. A break-even point based 
on operating cash flows is introduced to derive the indicator. The sign of abnormal accruals 
is used as a signal of earnings management in prior studies. However, this study proposes 
the addition of the above indicator as another proxy of managers' discretion. This study tests 
the big bath accounting hypothesis for firms whose abnormal accruals are restricted to be 
negative to examine the significance of the indicator. Results suggest that the indicator can 
serve as a proxy supporting the function of abnormal accruals, or give a threshold to identify 
abnormal accruals as a proxy of managers' discretionary behaviors. 
